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Abst rac t - -Th is  paper is concerned with a game variant of an asset selling problem, that is, prices 
of players' assets take several values according to the number of persons who want to sell them. 
We formulate the above situation as a stopping problem of a two-person oncooperative game and 
prove the existence theorem of an equilibrium point under the independence assumption ofplayers' 
information. © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An asset selling problem was investigated first by Karlin [I]: a person is to sell an item e.g., 
a house, a car, a share of stock--within a certain fixed length of time. Offers to buy the item 
occur at every period. The price presented at each period is assumed to be random variable with 
a known distribution function. A decision is made whether to accept or reject each offer. The 
objective is to maximize his expected reward. 
Let us consider a game variant of the above problem: many persons are to sell their assets. 
Prices of their assets, presented at each period, are observed values of random variables which 
take several values according to the number of persons who want to sell them. For each person, 
a decision is made whether to sell his asset (to stop the observation process) or not to sell it (to 
continue the observation). The objective for each person is to maximize his expected reward. 
In this paper, first of all, we formulate our situation by a stopping problem of a two-person 
noncooperative game and prove the existence theorem of an equilibrium point in our problem. 
An example is given to show the explicit solution of the game. 
Let two persons be players i , j  (i ~ j; i , j  = l, 2), and the length of time N be a positive integer 
and N = {1, 2 , . . . ,  N}. Let {(X~, Y~), (X~, Y•); n e /V}  be two bisequences of two-dimensional 
random variables defined on a probability space (~, ~,  P). The stochastic assumptions are made 
as follows. 
ASSUMPTION (Aa). ( X~, Y~) and (X~, Yn i) are mutually independent and identicafly distributed 
random variables with common c.d.£ F(x,,v,) and F(xJ,v~), respectively, for all n E N. 
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ASSUMPTION (Ab). X~ and Y~ axe integrable for each i = I, 2 and for all n E N ,  that is, 
E[IX'I] := fA [xlFx'(dz) < oo, where Fx, is a marginal c.d.£ of X i. 
ASSUMPTION (Ac). c i (> 0), i = 1, 2 is a unit observation cast per period for each player i. 
Under the above assumptions, we shall consider the following two-person stopping problem 
defined by Rules (Ran)-(Rdn). 
RULE (Ran). For each period n, if two players i and j stop simultaneously, player i receives his 
reward Y~ - nc ~ and player j receives his reward Y~ - nc j and they stop the observation. 
RULE (Rbn). For each period n, if player i stops and player j continues, player i receives X~ -me i
and stops the observation, player j continues alone, a one-person stopping problem with the 
remaining process {X~+k; k = 1, 2,. . . ,  N - n}, i.e., if player i stops at m period (n < m _< N), 
he receives XJm -mc J  and stops the observation. At the period N, he has to stop the observation. 
RULE (Run). For each period n, if two player i and j continue simultaneously, they continue 
this two-person stopping problem with the remaining process { (X~+k, Y~+k), (X~+k, Y~+k); k = 
1, 2, . . . ,  N - n}. At the period N, they have to receive Y~ - Nc i and Yg - NcJ,  respectively, 
and stop the observation. 
In this paper, we treat the above stopping problem as a nonconstant-sum noncooperative game, 
we assume that player i observes only the value of (X~, Yn ~) in order to make his decision. 
i for player i, which is ~ i RULE (Rdn). For each period n, a stopping strategy sn a( X , Y~)-measur- 
1 on a set S~ able function, is defined by a probability of the stopping the observation, i.e., s n = 
and = 0 on the complement set ~n, where S~(C R 2, E a(X~, Y~)) is called a stopping region for 
player i. 
i and s~ are stochastically independent, which is very essential The Rule (Rdn) means that s n 
to our stopping problem. The planning horizon consists of N opportunities to stop, the periods 
are renumbered backwards for convenience. 
2. A ONE-PERIOD PROBLEM 
For random variables ((X~, Y~), (X1 j, YlJ)) and real numbers ~ i ((I , J~), (I~, g~)), the rule of the 
one-period problem is redefined as follows. 
RULE (Ral). If two players i and j stop simultaneously, player i receives his reward Y1 i - c i and 
player j receives Y1 j - cJ and they stop the observation. 
RULE (Rbl). If player i stops and player j continues, player i receives X~ - c ~ player j receives 
I j  - c j and they stop the observation. 
RULE (Rcl). If two player i and j continue simultaneously, player i receives J~ - c i player j
receives J0 j - c j and they stop the observation. 
For a pair of stopping regions (S~, S/), the one-period expected reward M~ for player i is given 
by 
J . (2 .1 )  
where E[X; A] := fA xFx(dx) .  
Since S~ and S~ are independent from Rule (Rdn), (2.1) is calculated as follows: 
It is shown that from (2.2), M~ depends on S~ only through the stopping probability P(S~) 
of player j. Let p~ := P(S~), P J1 := P(S~) = 1 - p~, j = 1, 2. 
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Figure 1. The set *S~ and its boundary set O*Sl. 
Assume that player i knows the value of p~, he can maximize M~ by putting S~ = *S~ or 
= u o*s , 
The set *Si and its boundary set O*S~ are illustrated in Figure 1. 
It is clear that player i may stop or continue the observation as he pleases on the boundary set 
O*S~(p~). So that, we can generalize the stopping strategy to the randomized one which will be 
in Definition 1. 
Now, we can define a set-valued mapping 
(2.5) 
which maps from the compact set [0, 1] x [0, 1] to the class of closed convex sets on itself. Since the 
mapping pJ ~-* P(*S~ (p~)) has at most countable discontinuous points because of the property of 
the distribution function F(x~,r0. Then, the mapping (2.5) is upper-semicontinuous. And from 
Kakutani's fixed-point heorem (c.f., [2]), there exists at least one fixed point of (2.5), 
(.p~,.p2) e [0, 1] x [0, 1]. (2.6) 
DEFINITION 1. RANDOMIZED STOPPING STRATEGY (RSS).  For any fixed-point (*pi,*p~) 
of (2.6), a pair of RSS's (*s~, *s~) is defined as [ollows: 
0, otherwise, 
where al(*P~), 0 < ai(*P~) -< ~ is given by 
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Figure 2. The mapping p{ ~-* p~. 
The illustration of p~ is shown in Figure 2. 
If one of the fixed-point (*p~, *p~) of (2.6) is solved, since player i knows player j 's stopping 
probability *p~, he may construct the randomized stopping strategy *s~ (*p~) from Definition 1 
in order to maximize his expected reward M{ of (2.2)• By doing so, player i's stopping prob- 
ability *p~ remains unchanged• It is pointed out that the RSS is a convex combination of two 
strategies of stopping and continuing the process• 
As the summary of Section 2, we mention two lemmas without proof, which are easily proved 
from the above argument• 
LEMMA 1. For any given constants (I~, J~), i = 1, 2, a pair oI RSS (* s~, * s~) given by Definition 1 
is an equilibrium point for the one-period problem (M{, M~), that is, for any RSS s~ for player i, 
. ( ( . s~ . . . .  M{ kk 1,*s~),(I~,Jg)) > M{ ((s],*s~) ,(I~,Jg)), i --1,2. (2.8) 
LEMMA 2. For any pair o[RSS (s~, st) ,  
3. AN n-PERIOD PROBLEM 
In this section, we shall derive a pair of equilibrium policies for players (i,j). First, let us 
define the reward I~ of the Individual stopping problem, which represents the optimal reward 
for player i in the one-person -period stopping problem (c.f., [1]). 
DEFINITION 2. Reward with Individual stop: 
I~ :=E[X~] -c  ~, I~ :=E[X~- I~_1]  ++z ~ " n_ l - -C  z, i - -1 ,2,  neN.  (3.1) 
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Let us define a stopping policy a~ for player i by 
(3.2) a n:-- (sin,. . . ,s~), i=1 ,2 ,  HEN.  
(a,~,an), let us define the expected reward Min /or player i by the For any pair of policies ~ J 
following recursive equations: 
[ -- / i - l )  = , (I~_l,Mni_l)) = E P (Sn  j) (Yn iM~ a i , (I~_1, i (( n,(Tn j) /~--1)) Un ((8~, Sn j) i i 
+P (SJ)(X~ -- M~_I) ; S~] -t- ' : _ IP  (Sn j) (3.3) 
+ M~_xP (S~) - c', where M~ := J~ = E [Y0 i] - c'. 
Now, we shall determine a pair of equilibrium policies. For this, we put a condition. 
CONDITION. For any given constants ( I~, J~), i = 1, 2, a fixed-point (*Pl, * P~) of (2.5)is solvable. 
For constants I~ := E[X~] - c' and J~ := E[Yd] - c i, i = 1, 2, a fixed-point (*Pl, *P~) is solved 
from the condition. Then a pair of RSS (*s~, *s~) is obtained from Definition 1. Hence, we can 
• " (J~, Jd ) by the ( Sn, *s~), and following Definition 3. The determine sequences of (*p~, *pnJ), * ~ " ~ J
reward J~ of the Jointly stopping problem represents he value of the reward for player i in the 
two-person -period stopping problem. 
DEFINITION 3. Reward with Jointly stop: 
J~:= M~ ( (*s~,*s~),( l~, Jg) ) (3.4) 
[ ) ] .  • . . . _ , . ,  =E *p~(Y~- I~)+*p l (X i - J ;  + px.o + px. .o-C ' ,  
gn i := Min ((* S'n, * sjn),(I in_l, J~_l)) 
• * - J r~  , - J -~  • (3 .5 )  
= E[*p~ (Y~- l in_1)  +*~3 n (X~-  J~_x)] + + "n 'n - ,  + PnJn-1 -c ' ,  
where (*p~, *pn j) and * i • ( sn, *s3n) are determined when ( j i  j f  ~-1, ~-lJ are obtained from (3.5) recur- 
sively. 
As the summary of Section 3, we mention our main theorem, which is proved by induction 
on n and Lemma 2. 
THEOREM 1. A pair of stopping policies (*a~v, *aft ) is an equilibrium point for the n-period 
for player i, stopping problem, i.e., for any policy a n 
J~ = M~ (( a n, a~),~ n- l ,  n-,]]  (3.6) 
i=1,2, HeN 
4.  EXAMPLE 
In this section, we shall consider the examples which satisfy the condition, that is, the fixed 
point of (2.6) is calculated for the n-period jointly stopping problem. 
For this, we put the following assumptions for the example. 
EXAMPLE (Ea). The player i and j have same stochastic and cost structures, i.e., the random 
variables (X~, Yn ¢) and (X~, Yn/) have a common c.d.f. F(x,,y,) so that they are denoted by 
(Xn, Yn). And c i = cJ =: c. 
It enables us to find the pair (*pi n, *pg) of the form *P~n = *P~ --: *Pn. 
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EXAMPLE (Eb). The random variables Xn and Yn (n = 1, 2, . . .  ) have a same c.d.f. Fx,  and Fy., 
respectively, so that they are denoted by Xn and Yn. 
It is only for the computational convenience. 
EXAMPLE (Ec). Y = aX, a E (0, oc). 
It means that the stopping region *S~ of (2.3) is degenerated to the half-line (*x, oo), i.e., 
*S~ = {X > *x}. A scalar a may represent the following game situation: when 0 < a < 1, 
players' assets are in competition, which means Jn <_ In. When 1 < a < o¢, they are worth 
gathering, which means Jn >_ In. 
EXAMPLE (Ed). The random variable X is distributed with U(0, 1) and c = 0. 
It is only for the computational convenience. 
Under Example (Ec), (2.3) is given by 
*S= {x > (p I  +~J~ =: ] *x}. (2.3') 
Under Example (Ed), *p = P(X  > *x) = 1 - *x. The fixed-point *p on [0, 1] of (2.5) is uniquely 
determined by 
(25,) *P = \ *~ + *pa / " 
In fact, when *~ moves from 1 to 0, the right-hand side of (2.5') moves from J (< a) to 
I / a  (> 0). Then, the number of solutions on [0, 1] is odd. Since the equation of *~ is quadratic, 
the solution on [0, 1] is unique. 
For n = 1, putting I = I0 = 1/2 and J = J0 = a/2, let us compute p = *Pl from (2.5') and 
the stopping region *$1 and the reward J1 with jointly stop, 
*S1 = {x > 1 - *Pl}, (2.3") 
1 g l=E[*p l (O~X-1) - l - * , l (X -1 ) ]+- t -~.  (3.4') 
For n = 2, putting I = I1 in (3.1) and J = 11 in (3.4'), let us compute p = *P2 from (2.5 ~) and 
so on. 
Hence, for all n E N ,  *Sn, *Pn, and Jn are uniquely determined. 
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